In this paper, we present a new family of fountain codes which overcome adversarial errors. That is, we consider the possibility that some portion of the arriving packets of a rateless erasure code are corrupted in an undetectable fashion. In practice, the corrupted packets may be attributed to a portion of the communication paths which are controlled by an adversary or to a portion of the sources that are malicious.
For instance, consider a case when communication is done over parallel paths and some paths are under the control of an adversary. Assume an LT code is used, and encoded packets are further encoded using an error correcting code, to asses the integrity of arriving packets. Consider an adversary which corrupts a single packet and the packet's error correction padding, such that the error correcting code does not identify the packet as a corrupted packet. This corrupted packet may well prevent the receiver from correctly decoding the entire original message.
In this work, we design and analyze novel erasure codes which are capable of withstanding malicious packet corruption. Our coding scheme resemble LT codes, yet are information theoretically secure (in a sense to be rigorously defined). Moreover, they include encoding schemes which are oblivious to the strength of the adversary, and, furthermore, allow a decentralized operation mode, where coded data is sent from multiple senders simultaneously (having access to the same data), without any cooperation among the senders.
We first list a few possible applications. In Section I-B, we refer to previous work and its relevance to our model in more detail. Section I-C includes the main contributions.
A. Applications
Corruption resilient fountain codes have numerous applications. We present here but a few.
Erasure coding: Consider a Peer-to-Peer system, where a user would like to receive some content. To alleviate the load on any single peer, the content may be mirrored at several peers. On the other hand, to maximize bandwidth usage, the user should be able to receive parts of the content from several mirrors in parallel. Erasure codes, and in particular digital fountain codes, give rise to a simple solution to this problem; each mirror locally, and independently, generates packets and sends them to the user. Alas, the system described above is very sensitive to Byzantine peers; when even one of the mirrors intentionally corrupts packets, the receiver will never be able to reconstruct the requested content. A more robust solution is to use the corruption resilient fountain codes derived herein, such that a constant fraction of Byzantine mirrors can be tolerated.
Shared value: Consider a group of sensors which receive and record global inputs. The inputs may be from a control and command entity, such as a satellite, or a natural event that the sensors sense. The sensors wish to store such inputs (or some global history) for later retrieval. Assume the initially shared value x includes k bits. We wish to reduce the storage requirements at each sensor, such that each sensor will only need to store a fraction of the k bits. We require that no communication takes place during the initial stage, so that each sensor generates its own encoded (short) share of x 0090-6778/13$31.00 c 2013 IEEE independently of other sensors. The sensors may communicate later to reconstruct x from the stored shares. Moreover, the solution should be robust against a constant fraction of Byzantine sensors, where a Byzantine sensor may introduce arbitrary information into the system.
Corruption resilient fountain codes can be used to solve the shared value problem. We present a randomized scheme in which shared data is efficiently recorded with no communication among the sensors. Note that, in some cases, it is also possible to update the encoded data without decoding (e.g. [6] ).
B. Related Work
The current literature includes several different strategies for coping with Byzantine adversaries, both in regular, pointto-point erasure coding and network coding scenarios. A common approach to overcome Byzantine adversaries when implementing erasure codes is to check each received packet against a pre-computed hash value, to verify the integrity of the packet. When using fixed rate codes, the sender can precompute the hash value of each possible packet and publish this hash collection in a secure location. The receiver first retrieves this pre-computed hash collection and verifies each packet against the packet's hash as the packet arrives. The hash is a one way function and, therefore, when the adversary is computationally limited, the adversary cannot introduce another packet with the same hash. However, when using rateless codes, such techniques are not feasible; as there is practically an infinite number of different packets, there is no efficient way to pre-compute the hash value of each possible packet and send these hashes to the receiver. Furthermore, inherent to hashing technique is secure publication of the hashes. The sender must devise a way to securely transfer hashes to the receiver, say, by an expensive flooding technique. In this work, we completely avoid the need for such a secret channel.
In [8] , a slightly different technique for packet verification in rateless codes is used. Therein, a Merkle-tree [10] based signature structure is suggested. However, the solution proposed is, still, only valid against computationally bounded adversaries and relies on the existence of homomorphic, collision-resistant hash functions. Furthermore, as the size of a Merkle-tree is linear in the size of the original message, the authors propose a process of repeated hashing to reduce the size of the tree. Such recursive application of a hashing function is more likely to be susceptible to attack.
An efficient scheme for signature generation of rateless codes appears in [15] , where the authors use the computational hardness of the discrete log to provide a PKI which enables the sender to efficiently sign each packet transmitted. The scheme is based on looking at the data being sent as spanning a specific vector space, and looking at packets as valid as long as they belong to the same vector space. The verification part uses standard cryptographic devices to facilitate the check.
In this paper, however, we provide an information theoretically secure rateless erasure code, by introducing encoding and decoding techniques which have a provable low probability of not recovering from an attack, assuming sufficiently many packets are collected.
The recent paradigm of network coding renewed the interest in protecting against Byzantine attacks. In a network coding scenario, protecting against such attacks is even more complicated, as erroneous or attacked packets can affect more and more packets as they propagate through the network. Moreover, straightforward implementations of LT or Raptor codes in a network coding scenario can fail, as these rely on specific coefficients distributions, which may be altered by the network code. The codes we present herein are not directly intended to a network coding scenario (though, as we mention later, can be applicable in some cases), yet, since a valid solution to this scenario results in a valid solution in ours as well, we present the relevant results. Due to space limitations, we do not include a survey of the vast and inspiring literature on network error correction, and review only the most relevant works. For more details, see references therein.
Several network coding related papers do discuss the merits of using hash functions to overcome Byzantine adversaries in network coding protocols, similarly to the works discussed above. Yet, all of which require out of band communication or preprocessing. Other protocols employ some kind of shared secret between the sender and receiver to cope with computationally bounded adversaries. A different solution, however, appears in [14] where the only assumption needed to overcome an all-powerful adversary is a shared value between the sender and the receiver, which may also be known to the adversary. This shared value is, in fact, a parity check matrix, with which a sender inserts redundant bits to the data, enabling the receiver to identify the single correct message from a list generated by a list decoder. Using sufficient redundant information, the receiver can overcome a Byzantine adversary, as long as the adversary cannot control more than half of the network's capacity (which is the minimal cut between the sender and receiver). While this solution requires some out of band communication, as the sender and receiver must share a value (the redundancy matrix) before starting the communication, it can be seen as part of the protocol. However, more importantly, this redundancy matrix, which controls the amount of the redundant information inserted, needs to be known at the sender in advance. In other words, a sender needs to know how strong the adversary is (how many packets it controls) in order to know how much redundant information to insert. In the solutions we present herein, the sender is completely oblivious to the strength of the attacker (or its actual existence). Finally, note that the solution presented in [14] requires batching packets into groups of predetermined size and is not rateless in nature, especially not when a few senders are involved.
In [9] , Koetter and Kschischang present a different approach, based on high dimensional vector spaces; a message of m · k bits is encoded into a vector space, V , of dimension l ≤ m, which is a subspace of an ambient vector space W of dimension l + m. l is a parameter of the encoding scheme, m is the number of bits in a message block and k is the number of blocks in the message. Each packet the sender creates is a randomly chosen vector (of l + m bits) in V . The receiver, upon collecting enough vectors -l linearly independent vectors -can proceed to reconstruct the original message from the received vector space U . The authors present a minimal distance decoder, which can recover V from U provided that, when writing U as
The codes presented in [9] have both theoretical and practical merits. Moreover, further extensions and practical coding schemes improve on the original results in [9] , e.g., the coding scheme in [16] . Nevertheless, important differences compared to the scheme we suggest here should be noted. First, the codes in [9] are not rateless in nature. While the rank metric codes used therein are analogous to Reed Solomon codes, which can be seen as rateless if the encoder generates a large enough generator matrix, this ratelss property is not explicit in [9] , and requires working over a large finite field. Moreover, to use such codes from multiple senders simultaneously, each sending data on a shared source, but at possibly different rates and error probabilities, ones needs to either synchronize the senders (on which rows from the generator matrix to use), or randomly select rows at each sender, assuming that if the field size is large enough, repetitions of rows will occur with very small probability. In this work, the codes are inherently rateless and distributed, and operations can be done over GF (2) . We also mention that the codes presented herein are conceptually very simple, with only XOR operations performed on the packets during the encoding, and essentially solving linear systems during decoding. This results in efficient and straightforward hardware implementation. Finally, as we summarize in Fig. 1 , the scheme suggested herin may be favorable in terms of complexity as well. Still, in order to do justice to the schemes in [9] , [14] , we mention that fully supporting error correction in a network scenario (under, e.g., linear network coding) is a complicated task, which is carried out in these schemes completely. The scheme in this paper, however, only partially supports network coding, as both sparseness and error correction can be damaged across the network. Particularly, it is not hard to see that if the diameter of the network does not scale with the block length, the codes we present here remain sparse despite the network coding, but this is not the case if the network diameter grows. In a similar way, if attacked packets cannot significantly propagate through the network, the codes we suggest are still efficient in a network-coded scenario, but this may not be the case in general. It is also important to note that if one chooses not to perform network coding, rates obtained can be strictly suboptimal.
Recently, [17] suggested a scheme resilient to malicious edge adversaries. This scheme, based on random subspace codes, is capacity achieving with polynomial time complexity. Yet, it is not oblivious in the sense we discuss in this paper. Moreover, the adversarial model is different, with the number of links attacked being a key parameter. In [18] , rateless codes directly tailored to network coding were devised. However, resilience to adversarial attacks is not considered therein.
To conclude, the table in Fig. 1 includes a basic comparison to the closely related schemes, in terms of desirable properties and complexity.
C. Main Contributions
In this work, we design and analyze rateless codes with the following merits. First, they are resilient to Byzantine attacks. When the fraction of corrupted packets is bounded above by 1/3, they asymptotically achieve the optimum rate of C − 2f , where C is the channel (or network) capacity, and f is the number of corrupted packets. Second, the codes use sparse encoding vectors. When a randomized algorithm is used to reduce the complexity, this enables a decoding complexity (solving a sparse linear system) of O(k 2 log k log log k) instead of the usual O(k 3 ) for non-sparse codes, using known algorithms for solving sparse equations, e.g. [12] . For k = 100, this is 1.8 · 10 5 instead of 10 6 . Third, the encoding scheme carried out at the sources does not depend on the strength of the adversary (the number of packets it can corrupt), and hence is universal in this sense. Fourth, the codes do not require any secrete channel or shared data between the sources and receivers. Moreover, no communication between the sources is required in case a few sources cooperate to send a common global value.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The system settings and attack strategies on existing codes appear in Section II. Our new coding schemes appear in Section III. The paper is concluded in Section IV.
II. SYSTEM SETTINGS AND ATTACK STRATEGIES
A rateless erasure code is defined by a pair of algorithms, (E, D), such that, given a set of input symbols, E can produce a practically infinite sequence of different output packets. Moreover, from any large enough set of packets, D can be used to recover all of the original symbols. A rateless erasure code is usually used between a sender and a receiver, where the sender wishes to send a specific message to the receiver. The sender starts by dividing the message into symbols, and then uses E to generate packets, which are then sent to the receiver over a lossy channel. The receiver, after collecting enough packets, uses D to recover the original symbols and, from them, the message.
Next, we define the adversarial model we use. We assume that the computational power of the adversary is unlimited, and the adversary may sniff all traffic in the network. Furthermore, the adversary may forge or alter packets such that the receiver cannot differentiate them from legitimate packets. The only restriction we place on the adversary is the number of packets the adversary may corrupt. The restriction is defined by looking at all packets arriving at the receiver. We say that an adversary is c-bounded, with a parameter c ≤ 1 3 , if, for each i ≥ 4 and for each set of packets collected by the receiver of size i, no more than c · i packets are corrupted. This property captures the ratio between the number of collected packets and the number of errors allowed.
Given the above settings, we discuss possible ways an adversary may influence the Belief Propagation decoding algorithm used by [7] , [13] . Belief Propagation decoding suits the following succinct encoding algorithm: to generate a packet, choose a random subset of input symbols and XOR them. The exact distribution from which input symbols are sampled forms the critical part of the encoding algorithm, and Fig. 1 . Comparison of recent schemes. † -the scheme in [9] is not directly rateless, but can be constructed as such, similar to Reed-Solomon codes. Similarly, a decentralized version can be devised, at the price of high alphabet size. The complexity is based on the recent scheme in [16] .
defines the number of packets needed for correctly decoding the input symbols.
Belief Propagation decoding then works as follows: given a set of packets, define a bipartite graph, G = (A, B, E) , where the bottom layer, A, contains the packets and the upper layer, B, the input symbols. An edge exists between a packet a ∈ A and a symbol b ∈ B, if b was used in generating a. The Belief Propagation decoder is described in Fig. 2 , where the successful completion of the decoding process depends on the neighbor distribution. definitions:
Copy p to its only neighbor, s, which is then successfully decoded.
Fig. 2. Belief Propagation decoder

A. Attacking the Belief Propagation Decoding Algorithm
Consider the simple scenario depicted in Fig. 3 , of attacking a Belief Propagation decoding algorithm for the erasure channel (which sums up to solving a linear system by back substitution). The adversary can corrupt each decoded symbol by altering a single encoding packet overall. In general, it would be interesting to find the best possible strategy for the adversary given that the adversary works either offline or online and is uniform or selective.
• Offline vs. Online adversaries. An offline adversary knows, in advance, the graph generated at the receiver. An online adversary must base his decision to corrupt/inject a single packet on the information available from the packets that traversed the system so far.
• Uniform vs. Selective adversaries. A c-bounded uniform adversary simulates random noise by uniformly corrupting at most a fraction c of all the received packets. Bare in mind that such an adversary, though he cannot choose which packets to corrupt, can choose how to corrupt them, negating simple solutions such as using CRC or hashes. In contrast, a selective c-bounded adversary can choose, non-uniformly, which packets to corrupt (and, of course, how to corrupt the packets). It seems that the offline, selective adversarial model is the most severe model, and we will target our results appropriately. We will present more efficient solutions for a weaker model when applicable.
Under the definitions above, an interesting question is what would be the optimal strategy for a given adversary in order to corrupt the largest number of decoded symbols, given that the adversary is c-bounded. This immediately translates to an upper bound on the number of symbols the adversary can corrupt, a bound which may be employed in devising techniques to overcome the adversary.
We illustrate the vulnerability of the Belief Propagation decoder by presenting the following attacks, using an online, selective adversary. Note, however, that this by no means mean the Belief Propagation decoder is particularly vulnerable to the attacks we describe. Moreover, in case of errors (and not only erasures), a different algorithm would be used. Still, this will illustrate the ease in attacking an algorithm not intended to overcome byzantine attacks. On the other hand, we believe that the specific attacks we list and prove are not necessarily the most severe; our tests show that corrupting a very small (constant) portion of the packets corrupts almost half of the symbols.
• The Vanishing Symbol Attack. When using the Robust Solition distribution to generate packets, one may calculate the fraction of the packets in which each input symbol participates. Assuming that each symbol participates in the generation of a fraction of c packets, a simple online selective c-bounded adversary can remove all traces of the symbol from the system: fix an input symbol, B. The adversary will then remove from each packet in which B participated the indication that B was XORed into the packet. The decoder will then never successfully decode the entire message, as B will always be missing.
In [7, Theorem 13] , it is shown that the average degree of a packet, when using the Robust Soliton distribution, is in O(log(k/δ)) (where 1 − δ is the probability of successful decoding). As the input symbols for each packet is chosen uniformly, each input symbol has a probability of (approximately) log(k/δ) k to be chosen for each packet. This further implies that a c-bounded online, selective adversary may prevent the receiver from successfully decoding (approximately) ck log(k/δ) symbols. We note that this number of symbols is only a gross estimate, as symbols with smaller degrees than the average are numerous.
• Odd packets attack. The following simple online, selective adversary can corrupt all decoded symbols; Consider corrupting all packets which have an odd degree, i.e., connected to an odd number of symbols. Corrupt each packet by flipping all bits (or a subset thereof). Using a simple inductive argument, we are able to prove that the resulting decoded symbols from the Belief Propagation decoder will all be flipped.
Proof Sketch: The proof is by inspecting the sets of odd and even degree packets, throughout the execution of the Belief Propagation decoder. Packets of odd degree are corrupted, and packets of even degree are not. Moreover, as each packet moves from one set to the other, all the packets in the odd degree set remain corrupted and those in the even degree set remain correct. Since each symbol is eventually decoded by copying a packet of degree one, all decoded symbols will be corrupted.
The following proposition shows that indeed, when using the Robust Soliton distribution from [7] , the expected fraction of such odd degree packets is less than one third, and the adversary can corrupt all symbols with a non-zero probability.
Proposition II.1. When using the Robust Soliton distribution, the odds packets attack has a probability of at least one half to corrupt all decoded symbols. Proof: We start by analyzing the Ideal Soliton distribution from [7] , which specifies that, for k input symbols, the degree distribution of each encoded packet is
The probability that for a given packet p, the degree is odd is
We get that for k ≥ 38, the probability for each packet to be of odd degree is less than 1 3 . Now, consider a binomial random variable, X ∼ B(n, p), such that n equals the number of packets and 1/6 ≤ p ≤ 1/3. X represents the number of packets of odd degree. The adversary can successfully corrupt all symbols, as long as X ≤ n/3. Using the normal approximation for the binomial distribution (where Z ∼ U (0, 1)), we get that:
Therefore, the adversary has a probability of at least half to corrupt all decoded symbols by corrupting at most one third of the packets.
III. CORRUPTION RESILIENT FOUNTAIN CODES
We start the presentation of our codes by discussing the encoding phase. We then proceed to establish the necessary tools required for successfully decoding an encoded message, and present several decoding alternatives, discussing the merits of each.
A. Encoding
To encode a given message of n bits, split the message into l blocks (the input symbols), b 0 , b 1 , . . . b l−1 , each of length k = n l bits. For each 0 ≤ i < l, 0 ≤ j < k, let b j i be the j'th bit of the i'th message piece.
For a k dimensional vector v = (v 0 , v 1 , . . . , v k−1 ) over GF (2) define the characteristic boolean function (or linear form) f v : GF (2) k → GF (2) in the following way: f v (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x k−1 ) = j x j v j (in other words, the inner product of x and v over GF (2)).
To generate a packet p, randomly select a k dimensional vector r ∈ GF (2) k (the distribution used to sample r will be discussed later), and set p = (r, f r (b 0 ), f r (b 1 ), . . . , f r (b l−1 )). Note that, for brevity, each packet is assumed to be of length k + l bits; later, we show how to reduce the amount of redundancy needed from k to log 2 k bits, in essence by compressing the vector r. We define the following:
Definition III.1. Two packets, p 1 and p 2 , are termed independent if their associatedr vectors are independent over GF (2) .
Alternatively, encoding can be achieved by setting s i = b i 0 , b i 1 , . . . , b i l−1 and then p = (r, fr(s 0 ), fr(s 1 ), fr(s k−1 )), wherer ∈ GF (2) l and fr is the natural extension of f v to GF (2) l , that is fr(x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x l−1 ) = l−1 j=0 x j v j . This way, however, the encoding can be seen as XORing entire words, which is more efficient hardware-wise. We note that such encoding is similar to the one presented in [7] . The decoding procedures below are applicable for both encoding alternatives. For brevity, we only discuss the first.
B. Conditions for Linear Independence
Before introducing the decoding algorithms, we prove the following three Lemmas, which discuss the number of uncorrupted packets required in order to have a set k independent equations. These lemmas are required in order to determine how many packets should a decoder collect before attempting to decode, depending on its knowledge on the number of corrupted packets and, of course, the type of the adversary (random or selective). The first considers the probability that a uniformly random linear system is not of full rank.
Lemma III.1. The probability that a system M of m vectors of dimension k (m ≥ k), chosen at random uniformly and independently over GF (2) , is not of full rank k is at most
The importance of Lemma III.1 is clear. Suppose a decoder collects k + uncorrupted packets, k, whose coefficients are drawn from the uniform distribution. Then, with probability at least 1 − 2 − , the packets include k independent equations. Proof: (Adapted from [13] ): enumerate the vectors of M arbitrarily. Consider the case in which the first k vectors are not independent. If so, these vectors span, at most, a half plane of dimension k − 1. For the entire system M to be of rank less than k, each remaining vector should be in this half plane. The probability of each of these m−k vectors to be uniformly chosen from this half place is at most 1/2. Therefore, the probability that all of the remaining m − k vectors are chosen from the same half plane is at most 2 k−m .
The next lemma, however, stands at the basis of our sparsity result. It states that even when the coding vectors are sparse (with approximately log k non-zeros for each vector), the same rank result holds. With this lemma, it will be easy to show that a more efficient decoding is possible (since sparse matrices are less complex to invert [12] ) without harming the strength of the code.
Lemma III.2. The probability that a system M of m vectors of dimension k ≤ m over GF (2) , where each coordinate is 1 with probability p, independently of the others, with
The origin of the condition on p is in [4, Theorem 1] . Therein, the author discusses the probability that a random matrix of size k × m over GF (t) has a rank k − l, for some l ≤ k. In the binary case, for example, the main result is that as long as the probability for 1 does not tend to 0 or 1 too fast, the probability for having full rank is high. Specifically, the demand therein is that log k+d(k)
where d(k) can tend to infinity slowly, e.g., log log(k). We build on this result to prove Lemma III.2.
Proof: For convenience, we first give the result of [4, Theorem 1] in its notation. Let p n (k, t) be the probability that a random matrix over GF (t), of size (n − s) × n and a probability p(n) for non-zero element (all other elements are equiprobable), has rank n − s − k. If log n+d(n)
In our notation, we have t = 2, we replace n − s by k and n by m. We are only interested in the case where the matrix has full rank (i.e., k = 0 in the notation of (1)). Furthermore, we assume the size of the matrix tends to infinity, both column and row wise. However, it is important that m − k (s in the notation of (1)) is an integer bounded away from zero, s. Thus, by [4, Theorem 1], whose conditions now hold due to our requirement on p(k), the probability P (k, m) that a k × m matrix M , over GF (2) , with probability p(k) for non-zero entries, as m → ∞, does not have a full rank is:
, and set B n,l = n+l j=n x j . We will first show that ∀n, l : B n,l > x n−1 . The proof is by induction over l; it can easily be verified that for all n, B n,0 = x n > x n−1 . Assume the relation holds for all n and for a given l. We will show the relation holds for all n and l + 1:
Now, for a given n, as the series {B n,l } ∞ l=0 is monotonically decreasing, and according to the above is bounded by x n−1 , there exists a constant L(n), such that lim l→∞ B n,l = L(n). Clearly, L(n) ≥ x n−1 . As a result, we get that
We term the distribution in Lemma III.2, i.e., the distribution in which p = log k+d(k) k (or, alternatively, p = 1 − log k+d(k) k ), where d(k) → ∞ arbitrarily slowly, the log distribution. Note that using this distribution, the random matrices are sparse, with about log k non-zero elements in a row of length k.
The third lemma considers the possibility that any subset of sufficient size, out of the |N | collected packets, includes k independent equations. It will be applicable when one considers decoding under selective attacks, as in these cases it is no longer true that the uncorrupted packets arriving at the decoder have the originally intended distribution, and the previous two lemmas do not apply directly. Let h(p) = −p log p−(1−p) log(1−p) denote the binary entropy function. We have the following. Lemma III.3. Let S = {p j |p j = (r j , f b l (r j ))} be a set of packets, all generated using the uniform distribution, or the log distribution of Lemma III.2. Assume |S| = a · k, a ∈ R + . Then, with probability at least 1 − 2 −k(a−b−1−ah(b/a)) , where b ∈ R + , b < a, every subset of (a − b)k packets out of S contains an independent subset of size k.
Proof: Using the bounds given in Lemmas III.1 and III.2, we have:
For example, for b = 1 and a = 7, this probability is approximately 1 − 2 −0.123k . Since bk will later denote the number of corrupted packets, and a will be a constant chosen by the decoder, depending on b, we write a(b) to denote the value of a chosen by the decoder to ensure that Fig. 4 . Using majority logic to decode a message piece
C. Decoding
We present several possible ways to decode a value, where the trade off between the number of packets which need to be collected and the decoding time is investigated. We will limit the discussion to decoding a given message block, b l , where all message blocks may be decoded in parallel, using the same technique. Throughout the discussion, it is beneficial to consider both the total number of collected packets at the decoder (both original and corrupted) and the number of corrupted packets collected. Hence, we let N be the set of all collected packets, and f denote the number of corrupted packets collected. Note that c = f |N | . The first decoding algorithm is a majority test, included here to illustrate a simple, yet deterministic and polynomial, decoding procedure. While the complexity is polynomial in k, it is not rate-optimal in terms of the number of packets that needs to be collected for successful decoding. The randomized algorithm suggested later is superior both in expected rate and expected complexity. Majority voting. The decoding algorithm is depicted in Fig. 4 , and is applicable to both the uniform and selective adversarial models. To reconstruct a given message block, b l , given that at most f faults occurred, we need to collect 2f + 1 pairwise disjoint sets of packets, S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S 2f +1 , such that each set contains exactly k independent packets. In Lemma III.1 it was shown that indeed an addition of a constant number of packets to a set of k packets, ensures (with high probability) k independent equations. This applies to a random adversary, as the packets it corrupts are randomly selected, hence the distribution of the uncorrupted packets seen by the decoder is still random. However, this is not true for a selective adversary. Such an adversary has the ability to chose which packets to corrupt, and, consequently, change the distribution of the uncorrupted packets seen by the decoder, such that Lemmas III.1 and III.2 will not hold as is. In this case, Lemma III.5 comes in handy, as it assures that if enough packets are collected, with high probability any subset of (a − b)k packets will give the desired result. Clearly, more packets need to be collected ((a(b) + b)k packets, where f = b · k is the number of corrupted packets), but the trade-off allows handling a selective adversary.
From each set, S j , we can reconstruct an s j as a candidate message block. It then follows that the majority of the values is the correct message block. In other words, b l = argmax sj |{s i : s i = s j }|. Note that to ensure that |N |, the number of packets collected, will suffice to compose (2f + 1) sets of k packets, we need c
Thus, Majority voting decoding may be used only when the adversary is at most 1 2k -bounded. The running time of such an algorithm is dominated by the need to solve the (2|N |c+1) equation sets, which takes, in general, O(2N ck 3 ). However, using the sparse coding vectors of Lemma III.2, the complexity is O(2N ck 2 log k log log k), as sparse equations can be solved more efficiently [12] .
At the other extreme of the trade-off between complexity and rate, we present an asymptotically rate optimal algorithm using exhaustive search. Exhaustive search algorithm. Similar to the Majority test algorithm, we assume the number of packets corrupted, f , is known to the decoder, and his goals are to both decide how many packets to collect and, of course, decode the original block.
Lemma III.4. Let N = {p j |p j = (r j , f b l (r j ))} be a set of packets, such that |N | ≥ k + 2f + , drawn using either the uniform distribution or the log distribution. Define the following matrix,Â = (r j ) and letb = (f b l (r j )). Assuming that no more than f < k packets are corrupted by a uniform adversary, with probability at least 1 − 2 − , b l is the only solution to the following equation system which satisfies at least k + f + equations:Â ·x =b.
Proof: Knowing f , k an , the decoder collects k +2f + packets. Since there are at most f packets corrupted, there is at least one subset of k +f + un-corrupted packets. Denote it by S. There is at least one solution (the true one, denotedx) satisfying all the equations in S. However, since S includes at least k + uncorrupted packets, which, in turn, by Lemma III.2, contain k independent equations with probability at least 1 − 2 − ,x is actually the only solution satisfying all equations in S.
It remains to show that the decoder cannot find a different set of k + f + packets, all satisfying a different solution. Consider a set of k + f + packets, for which there is a solutionx satisfying all k +f + equations. If this set includes some subset of k + un-corrpted packets, then, since this subset includes k independent un-corrupted equations,x =x. If there is no such subset, then there are more than f corrupted equations, which is a contradiction.
Note that f < k and hence c = f k+2f + < 1 3 . Furthermore, note that the proof relies on the uniformity of the adversary since it assumes any set of uncorrupted packets of size k + satisfies Lemma III.1 or III.2, hence include, with hight probability, k independent equations. When the adversary is selective, this is not necessarily the case, as the adversary can choose which packets to corrupt, and thus inflect a different distribution of uncorrupted packets at the decoder. In that case, the following lemma will hold. Lemma III.5. Assume an encoder generates packets according to the uniform or the log distribution, and that no more than f packets are corrupted by a selective offline adversary. Let N = {p j |p j = (r j , f b l (r j ))} be the set of packets collected at the decoder, with |N | ≥ k + 2f . Definê A = (r j ) and letb = (f b l (r j )). Then, with probability at
l is the only solution to the following equation system which satisfies at least ak equations:Â ·x =b.
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Lemma III.4. For ease of reference we set f = bk, b ∈ R + and |N | − f = ak, a > b. The decoder collects (a + b)k = |N | packets. Since there are at most bk = f corrupted ones, the remaining ak = |N | − f include an uncorrupted subset of size (a − b)k = |N | − 2f , and by Lemma III.3, with probability at least 1 − 2 −k(a−b−1−ah(b/a)) , include k independent packets. This constitutes a valid solution. Any other solution which satisfies at least ak equations must coincide with that solution since at least (a−b)k of the ak equations are from uncorrupted packets and hence include k independent equations. Thus, with probability at least
l is the only solution to the system which satisfies at least ak equations.
Note that the exponent in
is in fact positive for N = k + 2f , and can be made negative only for larger values of N . For example, for f = 0.05k, N = 1.5k = 1.4k + 2f we have an error probability of 2 −0.09k .
It follows from Lemma III.4 that the solution,x, to the system of equationsÂ ·x =b, which correctly solves the largest number of equations is the (only) correct solution. Hence, an algorithm which solves the following optimization problem would have been invaluable: given a system of equations over GF (2) , find the best possiblex, which solves the maximal number of equations. Obviously, this is an NPcomplete problem (by a simple reduction from the max-cut problem, see [1] ).
Given Lemma III.4 and the above argument, a simple exhaustive search over all possible b l values yields the correct answer, which satisfies at least k+f + equations out of N (or (a − b)k out of the (a + b)k in the selective model, according to Lemma III.5). Exhaustive search decoding is applicable to all c-bounded adversaries. Nevertheless, as such a search is exponential in k -in fact, the running time of such an algorithm is in O(2 k + k · |N |) -it may not be applicable in all situations.
Next, we present better decoding algorithms, which trades decoding time for increased amounts of packets, assuming that the adversary is bounded by values smaller than 1/3. Randomized decoding algorithm. We use randomization in order to reduce the decoding complexity, given that the adversary is c-bounded (for an appropriate c, to be defined later), and may only corrupt at most f packets. The algorithm is depicted in Fig. 5 , and suits the uniform adversarial model, as we follow Lemma III.4 from the previous section. An extension to the selective adversary is trivial, with, of course, the right choice of parameters, as given in Lemma III.5.
Assume that we have collected N packets, such that |N | = g(k) + k + f + ≥ k + 2f + for some g(x) ≥ f to be defined later. Each subset of k + uncorrupted packets has a very high probability of containing a subset of k independent packets (Lemmas III.1 and III.2). Let this probability be p , which can be calculated according to Lemmas III.1 and III.2. The algorithm will work as follows: choose a random subset, S ⊂ N , such that |S| = k + . Let s be the unique solution (if such exists) to the equationÂ ·x =b, defined by S. If the obtained solution, s, satisfies more than k+f + equations out of N , then, according to Lemma III.4, with high probability b l = s and we are done (again, the high probability condition is due to the 2 − probability not to have a full rank). Now, let p k be the probability of choosing a subset of N with no corrupted packets (hence, the probability of finding the right solution). It then follows that the expected number of iterations of the algorithm is 1 p k p . As each iteration involves solving an equation system of dimension k, the running time for this step is O(k 2 log k log log k), using the algorithm in [12] . Moreover, at each iteration, one needs to validate the solution against at most |N | packets. However, each such packet contains approximately only log k non-zero coefficients, hence the validation process takes O (|N | log k) = (g(k) + 1) · · · (g(k) + f ) (g(k) + k + 1 + ) · · · (g(k) + k + f + )
We can thus choose g(k) according to our needs -either minimizing decoding time or minimizing the number of packets we need to collect. For example, choosing g(k) > f ·(k+ ) log b , for a constant b, results in p k > 1/b. Such a choice minimizes the run time to O(k 2 log k log log k), at the expense of having to collect many messages (g(k) ≈ kf ). Furthermore, such a decoding algorithm is only relevant when the adversary is at most 1 k -bounded. Reducing packets size. In Section III-A, we assume that each packet generated is of size k + m bits, where m is the size of each message block and k is the number of blocks. The k bits of redundancy are used to denote which blocks participated in the creation of the packet. In practice, these k bits may be compressed, using several techniques, into a logarithmic size. First, when choosing which blocks to XOR in a uniform fashion, the sender can use a PRNG to generate the required distribution, as proposed in [7] . The sender will use a different random seed for the PRNG for every packet generated, and only attach the seed to the packet. A seed of size logarithmic in k suffices, and the receiver can proceed to recover which blocks participated in creating a specific packet using the seed embedded in the packet.
A different approach, in which the use of a PRNG (pseudo random number generator) is not required, can be achieved by using the log distribution to select blocks for each packet; first generate a binary vector, r, of length k, in which each index is 1 with probability (1+δ) log k k , for some small constant δ. When sending each packet, do not attach r to the packet. Rather, attach the indices of r which contain 1.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS Error correcting codes, erasure correcting codes, communication networks and distributed computing are tightly coupled. The replication techniques used for obtaining fault-tolerance in distributed computing may be replaced by error and erasure correcting techniques. Beyond the memory overhead benefit, the dispersal of information can be useful to protect and hide clear-text values when necessary. In this work, we have presented efficient encoding and decoding schemes that enhance the correctability of well known rateless erasure correcting codes.
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